This paper analyzes the importance of monetary and fiscal policy shocks in explaining US macroeconomic fluctuations, and establishes new stylized facts. The novelty of our empirical analysis is that we jointly consider both monetary and fiscal policy, whereas the existing literature only focuses on either one or the other. Our main findings are twofold: fiscal shocks are relatively more important in explaining medium cycle fluctuations whereas monetary policy shocks are relatively more important in explaining business cycle fluctuations; and failing to recognize that both monetary and fiscal policy simultaneously affect macroeconomic variables might incorrectly attribute the fluctuations to the wrong source.
Introduction
The main contribution of this paper is to jointly analyze the importance of fiscal and monetary policy shocks in explaining US macroeconomic fluctuations. The existing empirical literature lacks such an analysis, as it separately considers either monetary policy or fiscal policy; the two are never examined together. For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2000, 2005) and Romer (1989, 1994) focus only on monetary policy shocks, whereas Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , Perotti (2004 Perotti ( , 2007 , Ramey and Shapiro (1998) , Ramey (2008) and Gali et al. (2007) only focus on government spending shocks. . 2 The figure suggests that the output fluctuations attributed to fiscal shocks are a medium-run phenomenon, whereas those attributed to monetary policy shocks are a shortrun phenomenon. We then proceed to carefully support our results by using both spectral variance decompositions as well as forecast error variance decompositions. The limited role of public spending shocks in driving business cycle fluctuations in output has been recognized earlier in the literature on estimating medium-scale DSGE models. However, by focusing only on business cycle frequencies, this literature has missed the empirically important effects of fiscal shocks at medium cycles, which we uncover in this paper.
The second stylized fact we establish is that failing to consider fiscal and monetary variables simultaneously in empirical analyses leads researchers to incorrectly attribute economic fluctuations to the wrong source. For instance, an important drawback of existing analyses 1 Some papers like Fatas and Mihov (2001) , Perotti (2004) and Caldara and Kamps (2006) study the effects of government spending shocks and include T-bill rates in their VARs, but do not consider joint effects of fiscal and monetary shocks. 2 The latter are obtained via "counterfactual"experiments. See Section 3 for more details.
that focus only on monetary policy shocks is that they ignore the importance of fiscal shocks altogether. In particular, we show that the large fluctuations experienced in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at the beginning of the 1990s were due to fiscal shocks related to the Gulf War episode rather than to monetary policy. Similarly, omitting monetary policy variables in the VAR may lead to incorrectly attributing fluctuations in 1973 and 1980 to fiscal shocks rather than to their true cause, the monetary policy shocks.
Finally, our empirical results provide an additional stylized fact in the current debate on the identification of government spending shocks. In a series of papers, Perotti (2007) ,
and Ramey (2008) disagree on the effects of government spending shocks on certain macroeconomic variables (see also Blanchard and Perotti, 2002) . We show that the government spending shocks identified in the two papers have significantly different effects on output at different frequencies: the government spending shock identified by Perotti (2007) mainly affects medium frequency components of macroeconomic variables, whereas Ramey's (2008) shock equally affects all frequencies.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a description of the data. 
Data Description
This paper analyzes the effects of monetary and fiscal policy shocks in a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) framework. Our basic VAR is the following:
where This section evaluates the relative importance of fiscal and monetary policy shocks in explaining US macroeconomic fluctuations by using historical counterfactual analyses. We will first focus on GDP and ask the question: how much of the volatility in US GDP is explained by each of the two shocks? Then, we will verify the robustness of our results for other variables.
To answer this question, we first estimate the VAR described by eq. (1) and then, conditional on the VAR parameter estimates, we perform a counterfactual analysis where we assume that the economy is driven only by each individual shock, one-at-a-time. To be precise, partition ε t according to eq. (1) as:
= 0, 3 We specify a VAR with variables in levels and a deterministic time trend in order to be consistent with the existing empirical works on fiscal shocks. The shocks identified with our procedure are close to i.i.d.
shocks in terms of persistence and other characteristics.
4 Ramey (2008) shows that the government spending shocks identified by a narrative procedure using dummy variables associated with the episodes of military build-up in Ramey and Shapiro (1998) Grangercause government spending shocks identified in a structural VAR with government spending ordered first.
By including the dummy variables in our VAR, our results are robust to this criticism. 5 The BIC criterion selects one lag for the VAR, and all the main qualitative results presented in this paper continue to hold with this choice of lag length. For completeness, the Not-for-Publication Appendix {ε r,t } T t=1 = 0 in the estimated VAR, we obtain the path of GDP that would have been observed if only government shocks were present, which we refer to as the "counterfactual with ε g,t " (labeled Y g,t ). On the other hand, by setting
T t=1 = 0, we obtain the path of GDP that would have been observed if only monetary policy shocks were present, which we refer to as the "counterfactual with ε r,t " (labeled Y r,t ). This empirical evidence suggests that monetary policy shocks might most likely be important for explaining business cycle fluctuations in GDP, whereas fiscal shocks might most likely explain medium term fluctuations in GDP. To further investigate this issue, we extract the business and medium cycle components of GDP by using the bandpass filter (Baxter and King, 1999) . We follow Stock and Watson (1999) and identify output at business cycle frequencies to be fluctuations between 6 and 32 quarters, labeled Y This is a novel empirical fact, with noteworthy implications for policy analysis. In fact, for example, our finding implies that monetary policy is more effective at stabilizing output fluctuations at business cycle frequencies while fiscal policy is more effective at stabilizing output in the medium/long run. Interestingly, the recent literature on estimating macroeconomic models has analyzed the importance of fiscal shocks in medium-scale DSGE models and has found that the contribution of fiscal shocks for explaining output fluctuations is negligible.
7 Our analysis corroborates these findings. However, by focusing on business cycle frequencies, this literature has missed the empirically important effects of fiscal shocks at medium cycles, which instead our analysis uncovers.
The same pattern also arises for other important macroeconomic variables, such as consumption and hours worked. As shown in Figures 2 and 3 To quantitatively assess the strength of the correlation between the business/medium cycle components of GDP and the GDP counterfactuals due to fiscal and monetary shocks, In the right panel of Figure 4 , the solid line reports the correlation between the counterfactual due to fiscal shocks and the business cycle component of output at various leads and
. The dotted line reports the correlation between the counterfactual due to fiscal shocks and the medium cycle component of output, corr
. According to the figure, indeed the correlation between the counterfactual due to fiscal shocks and the medium cycle component is substantially larger than that with the business cycle component, and the highest correlation is contemporaneous.
To conclude, the counterfactual analyses in this section suggest that monetary policy shocks are more important in explaining business cycle fluctuations in three macroeconomic variables (output, consumption and hours) than the fiscal policy shocks, whereas medium cycle fluctuations are driven to a greater extent by fiscal policy shocks than monetary policy shocks. The next section will provide additional empirical evidence to directly assess whether this is the case.
Spectral and Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
In order to further substantiate our claim that fiscal shocks are mainly responsible for medium cycle fluctuations, this section directly quantifies the effects of these shocks by using spectral variance decompositions as well as forecast error variance decompositions. As we will show, both decompositions strongly support our first stylized fact.
First, let us consider spectral variance decompositions. Table 1 shocks in explaining output at business cycle frequencies is around 16%, which is close to our estimate.
hours as well as consumption. , that is 6-200 quarters. 9 Notably, our empirical results in Table 1 could be strengthened by assuming a slightly different definition of medium cycle. In fact, note that at medium cycle frequencies the variance of the spectrum due to each of the two shocks intersect. This happens around a frequency equal to 0.10, corresponding to 63 quarters. If we redefine the business cycle to be between 8 and 63 quarters, and the medium cycle to be between 63 and 200 quarters, our results would be even stronger, as there is a monotonic increase in the spectrum of GDP due to fiscal shocks at low frequencies.
Next, we turn to forecast error variance decompositions. These provide additional empirical evidence on the contribution of each shocks in explaining the fluctuations in each of the macroeconomic variables. Table 2 shows that the percentage variance of macroeconomic fluctuations due to fiscal shocks is higher at longer horizons; in particular, for GDP the percentage variance due to fiscal shocks is largest at 34 quarters. On the other hand, the percentage variance due to monetary policy shocks is higher at shorter horizons; for example, in the case of GDP, the percentage variance due to monetary policy shocks is largest at 12 quarters. 10 The table also reports asterisks to highlight when the FEVDs at short and long 9 More in detail, the contribution of each shock at any given frequency is calculated as follows. First, calculate the spectral density of the linearly detrended Z t based on the structural shocks that are not
and
0 . The spectral density of Z t assuming only the j th shock hits the economy is given by
) ′ , where D j is a matrix of zeros except for a unity in the j th diagonal
The fraction of variance in the k − th variable in Z t due to shock j at frequency ω is given by: horizons are different, and shows that the differences are significant for a variety of series.
Therefore, forecast error variance decompositions also strongly support our first stylized fact.
In unreported results, we also investigated the robustness of our main findings to sub- 
where tr t is total reserves, nbr t is nonborrowed reserves plus extended credit, m t is a measure of money supply (M1). 13 We also consider a monetary policy shock identified as a shock to nonborrowed reserves in a VAR with the following or-
We finally demonstrate the robustness to alternative de-trending procedures due to the concern that linearly de-trending output with a constant time trend might induce low frequency movements in the presence of a substantial productivity slowdown such as that of 1973. One might be concerned that it is the government shock that captures those low frequency movements, since it is the most important shock at medium cycles. For these reasons, we also consider a VAR estimated with a break in trend: 14 We also verified that our main results are robust to estimating a stochastic rather than a deterministic trend, using a VAR where
and Zubairy (2010) for detailed empirical results based on these specifications.
Interaction between Fiscal and Monetary Policy Shocks
Since existing studies focus only on monetary policy shocks and completely ignore the importance of fiscal shocks, or vice versa, this section demonstrates that failing to consider fiscal and monetary variables simultaneously in empirical analyses leads researchers to incorrectly attribute economic fluctuations to the wrong source.
How does the inclusion of fiscal policy affect our understanding of US monetary policy?
In principle, including fiscal shocks may have consequences for the identification of monetary policy shocks. The goal of this section is to evaluate whether this is the case in practice by studying whether adding fiscal policy in the structural VAR leads us to re-assess the importance of monetary policy shocks in specific episodes.
Our benchmark is a VAR without government spending, that is:
where W t = (X ′ t , r t ) ′ are the endogenous variables, and the monetary policy shock is identified via a Cholesky decomposition where the interest rate is ordered last. We will denote the monetary policy shock estimated in the benchmark VAR by ε r,t . 15 Similarly, we will estimate the monetary policy shock in the basic VAR in eq. (1) and denote it by ε r,t . It is also interesting to analyze whether the inclusion of fiscal policy substantially changes traditional forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD) and impulse responses for monetary policy shocks. Figure 7 plots the percentage change in the FEVD of GDP due to 15 Note that ε r,t is the last element in the identified ε t vector, where u t = A 0 ε t , and A 0 is lower triangular.
monetary policy shocks resulting from the inclusion of fiscal policy relative to a baseline scenario with no fiscal variables. 16 
How does the inclusion of monetary policy affect our understanding of US fiscal policy?
Unlike in the case of monetary policy, where changes are implemented rather promptly, for fiscal policy the legislative process can take some time. During the delay in the announcement and the implementation of new fiscal policy measures, the agents in the economy may acquire information on these measures and react accordingly. Therefore, by excluding the monetary policy variable (the federal funds rate, in our case), we might be ignoring the information that lagged values of the interest rate carry about changes in current government spending, which eventually affects our measure of the government spending shock.
17
To assess whether the exclusion of monetary policy significantly changes our understanding of the fiscal policy transmission mechanism, we run a VAR without the federal funds rate, that is:
where Ξ t = (g t , X ′ t ) ′ are the endogenous variables, and the government spending shock is identified via a Cholesky decomposition where government spending is ordered first. We will denote the government spending shock estimated in the benchmark VAR described in eq.
(3) by ε g,t .
18 VAR specifications omitting the monetary policy variable such as eq. (3) are reported by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Ramey (2008) . Similarly, we will estimate the government spending shock in the basic VAR in eq. (1) and denote it by ε g,t . when we exclude monetary policy in the VAR, especially during the late seventies and early 17 Yang (2007) , in the same spirit, shows that by including lagged interest rates and prices in the VAR, the responses to a tax shock are altered, thus suggesting that these variables contain information about macroeconomic variables related to current tax changes. 18 Note that ε g,t is the first element in the identified ε t vector, where u t = A 0 ε t , and A 0 is lower triangular. 
Comparing Two Leading Methodologies for Identifying Fiscal Shocks
In the current literature there are two main alternative schemes used to identify government spending shocks. 19 This section compares these competing approaches, and shows that the shocks identified by the two procedures have very different implications at business and medium cycles. We also investigate possible explanations for these differences.
Let us start by briefly describing the two approaches. In the first approach, the government spending shock is identified by the assumption that government spending does not react contemporaneously to other macroeconomic variables -see Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , Fatas and Mihov (1999) and Perotti (2007) , among others. Following this approach, typically the government spending shock, denoted here by ε P erotti,t , is estimated via a Cholesky decomposition in the following VAR:
where
′ and government spending is ordered first. Notice that the VAR no longer includes the "narrative" measure of the government spending shocks discussed in 19 There is yet another alternative approach in identifying fiscal shocks using sign restrictions that is not considered here. See Mountford and Uhlig (2002).
In what follows, we will refer to ε P erotti,t as "Perotti's shock". 
where Figure 12 analyzes the contribution of both government spending shocks, ε P erotti,t and ε Ramey,t , at different frequencies. The figure shows the fraction of the variance of GDP due to each shock at different frequencies. The dashed line is the contribution of the government spending shock and the solid line is the contribution of the monetary policy shock. The upper panel shows results for Perotti's government spending shock, whereas the lower panel focuses on Ramey's government spending shock. It is pretty clear that Perotti's government spending shock is mainly associated with medium cycles, whereas Ramey's government spending shock affects both business and medium cycle frequencies equally. This is an additional difference regarding the effects of fiscal shocks identified via recursive ordering versus narrative approaches that is worth pointing out. Table 3 provides further empirical evidence by reporting the contribution of the two fiscal policy shocks in explaining the fluctuations in each of the macroeconomic variables at various horizons via forecast error variance decompositions. The table shows that the per-20 ε P erotti,t is the first element in the identified ε 1,t , where u 1,t = A 1,0 ε 1,t and A 1,0 is lower triangular. 21 ε Ramey,t is the first element in the identified ε 2,t , where u 2,t = A 2,0 ε 2,t , and A 2,0 is lower triangular.
centage variance of fluctuations in GDP, hours and consumption due to Perotti's government spending shock is bigger than that of Ramey's government spending shock in general, but especially so at long horizons. In particular, the contribution to the forecast error variance of the shock identified via Perotti's (2007) approach to both GDP and consumption is about 30% at medium to long horizons (20 to 40 quarters) whereas that of the shock identified via Ramey's (2008) approach is never more than 3% at those horizons. Unreported results show that the contribution of Ramey's government spending shock in explaining the volatility of most macroeconomic variables equally affects all horizons (reaching a maximum around 17 quarters for output), whereas the contribution of Perotti's government spending shock increases with the forecast horizon (reaching a maximum around 30 quarters for output).
The empirical evidence for real wages is more mixed, although it remains true that the importance of Perotti's government spending shock is much larger than that of Ramey's government spending shock at longer horizons.
In what follows, we investigate why the two shocks have different contributions at business and medium cycle frequencies. The explanation that we consider is that Perotti's shock is not persistent, but it propagates through the economy via government spending, which is a persistent process, whereas the law of motion of Ramey's shock is much less persistent. In and fiscal shocks and fits the data reasonably well. See Zubairy (2010) for more details. We perform the following exercise: we simulate data on government spending, output, hours, consumption, investment, wages, inflation and the interest rate based on the model using the parameter estimates in Zubairy (2010) , with the same sample size as in the data. In the model, government spending is given by the following process,
where based on estimates of the DSGE model, ρ g,y = −0.0032, and ϵ g,t is an iid normal random variable with a variance of 0.015 2 . Our objective is to study how the contribution of Perotti's shock changes at medium cycle frequencies depending on the persistence of the government spending process. The baseline case corresponds to estimated median values of parameters, where ρ g is 0.92. The low persistent spending case corresponds to the case where we simulate data with ρ g = 0.5. The highly persistent spending case corresponds to ρ g = 0.98. Figure 13 shows the contribution of the government spending shock at different frequencies for the three cases. Note that in the low persistent government spending case, the share of variance of output explained by government spending shocks at low frequencies is very low, whereas it becomes very high in the high persistent spending case. This means that, even though ε g,t is a one time shock, the high persistence implies that government spending takes a long time to come back to steady state and thus has persistent effects, which show up at low frequencies. We conclude that persistence can potentially explain the differences that we find between Ramey's and Perotti's identifications.
Conclusions
This paper establishes two novel stylized facts. First, we show that fiscal policy shocks are relatively more important in explaining medium cycle fluctuations in output whereas monetary policy shocks are relatively more important in explaining business cycle fluctuations.
While there is a wide literature on DSGE models that also finds that the contribution of fiscal shocks is negligible in explaining output fluctuations at business cycles, our results are important because they imply that, by focusing on business cycles, this literature is missing the effects of fiscal shocks at medium cycles. These empirical results are robust to different monetary policy identification schemes, the inclusion of taxes, and time variation due to the Great Moderation and the productivity slowdown of 1973. Second, we show that failing to take into account that both monetary and fiscal policy shocks simultaneously affect macroeconomic variables incorrectly attributes some macroeconomic fluctuations to the wrong source. It would be interesting to investigate whether the differences that we find when we jointly consider monetary and fiscal policy could be attributed to differences in policy rules or differences in the identified shocks, and to evaluate the extent of the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities. However, an answer to these questions would require a theoretical structural model. We therefore leave these issues to future research.
Finally, our empirical results add an interesting new stylized fact to the current debate on the effects of fiscal policy shocks. We show that the shock identified by Ramey (2008) affects both business and medium cycle frequencies equally, whereas the shock identified by Perotti (2007) mainly affects medium cycle frequencies. 
